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Abstract
This work views neural networks as data generating sys-
tems and applies anomalous pattern detection techniques on
that data in order to detect when a network is processing an
anomalous input. Detecting anomalies is a critical compo-
nent for multiple machine learning problems including de-
tecting adversarial noise. More broadly, this work is a step
towards giving neural networks the ability to recognize an
out-of-distribution sample.
This is the first work to introduce “Subset Scanning” methods
from the anomalous pattern detection domain to the task of
detecting anomalous input of neural networks. Subset scan-
ning treats the detection problem as a search for the most
anomalous subset of node activations (i.e. highest scoring
subset according to non-parametric scan statistics). Mathe-
matical properties of these scoring functions allow the search
to be completed in log-linear rather than exponential time
while still guaranteeing the most anomalous subset of nodes
in the network is identified for a given input. Quantitative re-
sults for detecting and characterizing adversarial noise are
provided for CIFAR-10 images on a simple convolutional
neural network. We observe an “interference” pattern where
anomalous activations in shallow layers suppress the activa-
tion structure of the original image in deeper layers.
1 Introduction
“Awareness of ignorance is the beginning of wisdom.”
– Socrates
We wish to give neural networks the ability to know when
they do not know. In addition, we want networks to be able to
explain to a human “why” they do not know. Our approach
to this ambitious task is to view neural networks as data gen-
erating systems and detect anomalous patterns in the “acti-
vation space” of their hidden layers.
The three goals of applying anomalous pattern detection
techniques to data generated by neural networks are to:
Quantify the anomalousness of activations within a neural
network; Detect when anomalous patterns are present for a
given input; and Characterize the anomaly by identifying
the nodes participating in the anomalous pattern.
Furthermore, we approach these goals without special-
ized (re)training techniques or novel network architectures.
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These methods can be applied to any off-the-shelf, pre-
trained model. We also emphasize that the adversarial noise
detection task is conducted in an unsupervised form, without
labeled examples of the noised images.
The primary contribution of this work is to demonstrate
that non-parametric scan statistics, efficiently optimized
over activations in a neural network, are able to quantify
the anomalousness of a high-dimensional input into a real-
valued “score”. This definition of anomalousness is with re-
spect to a given network model and a set of “background”
inputs that are assumed to generate normal or expected
patterns in the activation space of the network. Our novel
method measures the deviance between the activations of a
given input under evaluation and the activations generated
by the background inputs. A higher measured deviance re-
sult in a higher anomalousness score for the evaluation input.
The challenging aspect of measuring deviances in the
activation space of neural networks is dealing with high-
dimensional data on the order of the number of nodes in
a network. Our baseline example in this work is a convo-
lutional neural network trained on CIFAR-10 images with
seven hidden layers and contains 96,800 nodes. Therefore,
the measure of anomalousness must be effective in capturing
(potentially subtle) deviances in a high-dimensional space
and be computationally tractable. Subset scanning meets
both of these requirements (see Section 2).
The reward for addressing this difficult problem is an un-
supervised, anomalous-input detector that can be applied
to any input and to any type of neural network architec-
ture. This is because neural networks rely on their activation
space to encode the features of their inputs and therefore
quantifying deviations from expected behavior in the activa-
tion space has universal appeal and potential.
We are not analyzing the inputs directly (i.e. the pixel-
space) nor performing dimensionality reduction to make the
problem more tractable. We are identifying anomalous pat-
terns at the node-level of networks by scanning over subsets
of activations and quantifying their anomalousness.
The next contributions of this work focus on detection
and characterization of adversarial noise added to inputs in
order to change the labels (Szegedy et al. 2013; Goodfellow,
Shlens, and Szegedy 2014; Papernot and McDaniel 2016).
We do not claim state of the art results and do not com-
pare against the numerous and varied approaches in the ex-
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panding literature. Rather, these results demonstrate that the
“subset score” of anomalous activations within a neural net-
work is able to detect the presence of subtle patterns in
high dimensional space. Also note that a proper “adversarial
noise defense” is outside the scope of this paper.
In addition to quantifying the anomalousness of a given
input to a network, subset scanning identifies the subset of
nodes that contributed to that score. This data can then be
used for characterizing the anomalous pattern. These ap-
proaches have broad implications for explainable A.I. by
aiding the human interpretability of network models.
For characterizing patterns in this work, we analyze the
distribution of nodes (identified as anomalous under the
presence of adversarial noise) across the layers of the net-
work. We identify an “interference” pattern in deeper layers
of the network that suggests the structure of activations nor-
mally present in clean images have been suppressed, pre-
sumably by the anomalous activations from shallower lay-
ers. These types of insights are only possible through the
subset scanning approach to anomalous pattern detection.
The final contribution of this work is laying out a line of
research that extends subset scanning further into the deep
learning domain. This current paper introduces how to ef-
ficiently identify the most anomalous unconstrained subset
of nodes in a neural network for a single input. The subset
scanning literature has shown that the unconstrained subset
has weak detection power compared to constrained searches
where the constraints reflect domain-specific knowledge on
the type of anomalous patterns to be detected (Neill 2012;
Speakman et al. 2016).
The rest of this paper is organized in the following sec-
tions. Section 2 reviews subset scanning and highlights the
Linear Time Subset Scanning property originally introduced
in (Neill 2012). The section goes on to introduce our novel
method that combines subset scanning techniques and non-
parametric scan statistics in order to detect anomalous pat-
terns in neural network activations. Detection experiments
are covered in Section 3. We provide quantitative detection
and characterization results on adversarial noise applied to
CIFAR-10 images. Future methodological extensions and
new domains of application are covered in Section 4 and
finally, Section 5 provides a summary of the contributions
and insights of this work.
2 Subset Scanning
Subset scanning treats pattern detection as a search for the
“most anomalous” subset of observations in the data where
anomalousness is quantified by a scoring function, F (S)
(typically a log-likelihood ratio). Therefore, we wish to effi-
ciently identify S∗ = argmaxS F (S) over all subsets of the
data S. The particular scoring functions F (S) used in this
work are covered in the next sub-section.
Subset scanning has been shown to succeed where other
heuristic approaches may fail (Neill 2012). “Top-down”
methods look for globally interesting patterns and then iden-
tifies sub-partitions to find smaller anomalous groups of
records. These approaches may fail when the true anomaly
is not evident from global aggregates.
Similarly, “Bottom-up” methods look for individually
anomalous data points and attempt to aggregate them into
clusters. These methods may fail when the pattern is only
evident by evaluating a group of data points collectively.
Treating the detection problem as a subset scan has de-
sirable statistical properties for maximizing detection power
but the exhaustive search is infeasible for even moderately
sized data sets. However, a large class of scoring functions
satisfy the “Linear Time Subset Scanning” (LTSS) property
which allows for exact, efficient maximization over all sub-
sets of data without requiring an exhaustive search (Neill
2012). The following sub-sections highlight a class of func-
tions that satisfy LTSS and describe how the efficient max-
imization process works for scanning over activations from
nodes in a neural network.
Nonparametric Scan Statistics
Subset scanning and scan statistics more broadly consider
scoring functions that are members of the exponential family
and make explicit parametric assumptions on the data gen-
erating process. To avoid these assumptions, this work uses
nonparametric scan statistics (NPSS) that have been used in
other pattern detection methods (Neill and Lingwall 2007;
McFowland III, Speakman, and Neill 2013; McFowland,
Somanchi, and Neill 2018; Chen and Neill 2014).
NPSS require baseline or background data to inform their
data distribution under the null hypothesisH0 of no anomaly
present. The evaluation input (different than the background
inputs) computes empirical p-values by comparing it to the
empirical baseline distribution. NPSS then searches for sub-
sets of data S in the evaluation input that contain the most
evidence for not having been generated under H0. This evi-
dence is quantified by an unexpectedly large number of low
empirical p-values generated by the evaluation input.
In our specific context, the baseline data BH0 is the node
activations of 9000 clean CIFAR-10 images from the valida-
tion set. Each background image,Xi, generates an activation
AH0ij at each network node j; and likewise, an evaluation im-
age Xz (which is potentially contaminated with adversarial
noise) will produce activations Azj .
For a given evaluation image Xz , a collection of back-
ground images Xi ∈ BH0 , and a network with J nodes,
we can obtain an empirical p-value for each node j. This
is the proportion of activations from the background in-
puts, BH0 , that are larger than the activation from the eval-
uation input at node j. We extend this notion to p-value
ranges which posses improved statistical properties (Mc-
Fowland III, Speakman, and Neill 2013).
We use the following two terms to form a p-value range
at node j.
Nbeat(j) =
∑
Xi∈BH0
I(Aij > Azj)
Ntie(j) =
∑
Xi∈BH0
I(Aij = Azj)
The range is then defined as
pj = {pminj , pmaxj }
= { Nbeat(j)|BH0 |+ 1
,
Nbeat(j) +Ntie(j) + 1
|BH0 |+ 1
} (1)
The empirical p-value for node j may then be viewed
as random variable uniformly distributed between pminj and
pmaxj under H0. (McFowland, Somanchi, and Neill 2018).
As an example, consider a node j with activations AH0ij
= {−1,−1, 0.2, 0.75} for i = 0, 1, 2, 3 background im-
ages. An evaluation image Xz may create an activation at
node j of Azj = 0.8 and would be given a p-value range
pzj = (0/5, 1/5) for node j. A different evaluation image
may activate node j at Ayj = 0.1 and would be given a p-
value range of pyj = (2/5, 3/5). Finally, a third evaluation
image may produce an activation ofAxj = −1 at node j and
would be assigned a range of pxj = (2/5, 5/5).
Intuitively, if an evaluation image is “normal” (its activa-
tions are drawn from the same distribution as the baseline
images) then few p-value ranges will be extreme. The key
assumption for subset scanning approaches is that under the
alternative hypothesis of an anomaly present in the data then
at least some subset of the activations will appear extreme.
The p-value ranges from an evaluation input are processed
by a nonparametric scan statistic in order to identify the sub-
set of node activations that maximizes the scoring function
maxS⊆Pz F (S), as this is the subset with the most statistical
evidence for having been effected by an anomalous pattern.
The general form of the NPSS score function is
F (S) = max
α
Fα(S) = max
α
φ(α,Nα(S), N(S)) (2)
where N(S) represents the number of empirical p-value
ranges contained in subset S and Nα(S) is the total prob-
ability mass less than (significance level) α in these ranges.
The α level defines a threshold which p-value ranges can
be compared against. Specifically, we calculate the portion
of the range that falls below the threshold. This may be
viewed as the probability that a p-value from that range
would be significant at that α level and is defined as
nα(pj) =
α− pminj
pmaxj − pminj
(3)
bounded between 0 and 1.
This generalizes to a subset of nodes, intuitively.
Nα(S) =
∑
j∈S nα(pj) and N(S) =
∑
j∈S 1.
Moreover, it has been shown that for a subset S consisting
of N(S) empirical p-value ranges, E [Nα(S)] = N(S)α
(McFowland III, Speakman, and Neill 2013). Therefore,
we assume an anomalous process will result in some S
where the observed significance is higher than the expected,
Nα(S) > N(S)α, for some α.
There are well-known goodness-of-fit statistics that can
be utilized in NPSS (McFowland, Somanchi, and Neill
2018), the most popular is the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test (Kolmogorov 1933). Another option is Higher-Criticism
(Donoho and Jin 2004).
In this work we use the Berk-Jones test statistic(Berk
and Jones 1979): φBJ(α,Nα, N) = N ∗ KL
(
Nα
N , α
)
,
where KL is the Kullback-Liebler divergence KL(x, y) =
x log xy+(1−x) log 1−x1−y between the observed and expected
proportions of significant p-values. Berk-Jones can be in-
terpreted as the log-likelihood ratio for testing whether the
p-values are uniformly distributed on [0, 1] as compared to
following a piece-wise constant alternative distribution, and
has been shown to fulfill several optimality properties.
Efficient Maximization of NPSS
Although NPSS provides a means to evaluate the anoma-
lousness of a subset of activations for a given input, discov-
ering which of the 2J possible subsets provides the most
evidence of an anomalous pattern is computationally infea-
sible for large J . However, NPSS has been shown to sat-
isfy the linear-time subset scanning (LTSS) property (Neill
2012), which allows for efficient and exact maximization of
maxS⊆Pz F (S).For a pair of functions F (S) and G(j) rep-
resenting the score of a given subset S and the “priority” of
data record j respectively, we have a guarantee that the sub-
set maximizing the score will be one consisting only of the
top-k highest priority records, for some k between 1 and J .
For NPSS the priority of a node activation is the propor-
tion of its p-value range that is less than α and was intro-
duced in Equation 3. Gα(j) = nα(j).
Figure 1 shows a sample problem of maximizing a NPSS
scoring function over 4 example nodes and two different α
thresholds. The leftmost graphic shows p-value ranges for
4 nodes. We highlight node y that has pminy = 0.12 and
pmaxy = 0.32. For α = 0.2 we observe G0.2(py) = 0.4
as 40% of node y’s p-value range is below the threshold. A
larger proportion of node w’s p-value range falls below 0.2
and therefore node w has a higher priority than y.
We emphasize that a node’s priority (and therefore, also
the priority ordering) is induced by the α threshold value.
We demonstrate this by considering α = 0.3 in the example,
as well. The priority of node y increases to G0.3(py) = 0.9.
Furthermore, the priority ordering of the nodes has changed
for the different α values. Node x had a lower priority than
node y under α = 0.2 and a higher priority than node y
under α = 0.3.
The next take-away from the example in Figure 1 is how
the priority ordering over nodes creates at most 4 subsets
(linearly many) that must be scored for each α threshold
in order to identify the highest-scoring subset overall. Re-
call the general form of NPSS scoring functions F (S) =
maxα Fα(S) = maxα φ(α,Nα(S), N(S)), where N(S)
represents the number of empirical p-value ranges contained
in subset S andNα(S) is the total probability mass less than
(significance level) α in these ranges. When scoring the sub-
set {w, y} under α = 0.2 we evaluate φ(0.2, 1.1, 2) where
1.1 is the sum of 0.7 and 0.4 and 2 is the size of the subset.
The scoring function is then quantifying how “anomalous”
it is to observe 1.1 significant p-values when the expectation
is (0.2)(2) = 0.4.
We conclude the toy example by providing intuition be-
hind the efficient maximization of scoring functions that sat-
Figure 1: A sample problem with 4 nodes. The nodes’ p-value ranges are shown along with two different α thresholds. The
tables show the priority of each node for each threshold and lists the subsets that must be scored in order to guarantee the
highest scoring subset is identified.
Table 1: Convolutional Neural Network Architecture
Layer Details
Number of Nodes
in Layer
Conv 1 32, 3x3 32,768
Conv 2 32, 3x3 28,800
Pool 1 2x2 7,200
Dropout p = 0.25
Conv 3 64, 3x3 14,400
Conv 4 64, 3x3 10,816
Pool 2 2x2 2304
Dropout p = 0.25
Flat 512 512
Dropout p = 0.5
isfy LTSS. Notice under α = 0.3 we do not consider the
subset {w, x, z}. This is because we can guarantee a higher
score by either including y or removing z. The priority or-
dering over the nodes guides this inclusion sequence which
results in only linearly many subsets needing to be scored.
Network Details
We briefly describe the training process and network archi-
tecture before discussing adversarial attacks. We trained a
standard convolutional neural network on 50,000 CIFAR-10
training images. The architecture consists of seven hidden
layers summarized in Table 1. The first two layers are each
composed of 32 3x3 convolution filters. The third layer is a
2x2 max pooling followed by a dropout of p = 0.25. The
next three layers repeat this pattern but with 64 filters in
each of the two convolution layers. Finally there is a flat-
tened layer of 512 nodes with dropout of p = 0.5 before
the output layer. The model was trained using tanh activa-
tion functions and reached a top-1 classification accuracy of
74%. The accuracy is within expectation for a simple net-
work.
Relu activation functions did achieve slightly higher ac-
curacy for the same architecture, however an accurate model
is not the focus of this paper and Relu functions can be dif-
ficult to identify an “extreme” activation due to many of the
values being 0 for a given input . This was evident even if
the pre-activation value is anomalously high for the back-
ground but still 0 after Relu. It is possible to perform sub-
set scanning with relu functions with additional constraints.
For example, only allowing positive activations to be consid-
ered as part of the most anomalous subset. These constraints
clouded the story and we proceeded with tanh instead.
3 Detecting Adversarial Noise with Subset
Scanning
Machine Learning models are susceptible to adversarial per-
turbations of their input data that can cause the input to be
misclassified (Szegedy et al. 2013; Goodfellow, Shlens, and
Szegedy 2014; Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2016b;
Dalvi et al. 2004). There are a variety of methods to make
neural networks more robust to adversarial noise. Some re-
quire retraining with altered loss functions so that adversar-
ial images must have a higher perturbation in order to be suc-
cessful(Papernot et al. 2015; Papernot and McDaniel 2016).
Other detection methods rely on a supervised approach and
treat the problem as classification rather than anomaly de-
tection by training on noised examples (Grosse et al. 2017;
Gong, Wang, and Ku 2017; Huang et al. 2015). Another su-
pervised approach is to use activations from hidden layers as
features used by the detector. (Metzen et al. 2017)
In contrast, our work treats the problem as anomalous pat-
tern detection and operates in an unsupervised manner with-
out apriori knowledge of the attack or labeled examples. We
also do not rely on training data augmentation or specialized
training techniques. These constraints make it a more diffi-
cult problem, but also more realistic in the adversarial noise
domain as new attacks are constantly being created.
A defense in (Feinman et al. 2017) is more similar to
our work. They build a kernel density estimate over back-
ground activations from the nodes in only the last hidden
layer and report when an image falls in a low density part
of the density estimate. This works well on MNIST, but per-
forms poorly on CIFAR-10 (Carlini and Wagner 2017a). Our
novel subset scanning approach looks at anomalousness at
the node-level and throughout the whole network.
Table 2: AUC Detection Results for Subset Scanning over
Nodes vs. Scoring All Nodes
Attack
Type
Attack
Parameter
Subset
Scanning
All Nodes
FGSM
 = 0.1 0.9997 0.9990
 = 0.05 0.9420 0.8246
 = 0.01 0.5201 0.4980
BIM
 = 0.1 0.9913 0.9682
 = 0.05 0.8755 0.6961
 = 0.01 0.5177 0.4969
CW
κ = 0 0.5005 0.5035
κ = 10 0.5182 0.5020
κ = 20 0.5970 0.5230
Training and Experiment Setup
For our adversarial experiments, we trained the network de-
scribed in Section 2 on 50,000 CIFAR-10 images. We then
took |BH0 | = 9000 of the 10000 validation images and
used them to generate the background activation distribu-
tion (BH0 ) at each of the 96,800 nodes in the network.
The remaining 1000 images were used to form two groups:
“Clean” (C) and “Adversarial” (A) with Adversarial being
a noised version for various attack types. Group C did not
change for each attack type. We then score the 2000 im-
ages contained in A and C. We emphasize their measure of
anomalousness is not between the A and C noised counter-
parts but rather to the background originally formed byBH0 ,
respectively.
We do not calculate a score threshold for which any input
above that score is classified as noise. Rather we report the
area under the ROC curve which is a measure of how well
the score separates the classes A and C. A value of 1.0 means
the score perfectly separates the classes and a value of 0.5 is
equivalent to random guessing.
Results and Discussion
Table 2 provides detection power results (as measured by
area under the ROC curve) for a variety of attacks and their
parameters.The three attack types are the Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM) (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014)
and its iterative extension (BIM) (Kurakin, Goodfellow, and
Bengio 2016a). These two attacks have an  parameter which
is the maximum distance any pixel in the original image may
be changed. Note this value is in the [0,1] scaled pixel space
rather than [0,255].
The third attack was proposed by Carlini and Wagner
(CW) (Carlini and Wagner 2017b) and has a correspond-
ing κ parameter that can create “high confidence” attacks.
High confidence is measured by the κ difference between the
highest and second highest logit values in the output layer
(pre-softmax). All attacks were generated with CleverHans
Figure 2: Area under the ROC curve results for scanning
over seven individual layers of the network for multiple at-
tacks. The numbers in parentheses under each layer name is
the number of nodes in that particular layer.
package (Papernot et al. 2016; Papernot et al. 2018).
All detection results are for the Berk-Jones NPSS scoring
function introduced in Section 2.
The first numeric column shows the detection power when
subset scanning is used to identify the most anomalous sub-
set of activations for the input under evaluation. The last col-
umn shows the detection power when all nodes are consid-
ered together rather than the highest scoring subset. Detec-
tion power is higher when scanning over subsets of node and
demonstrates early promise for expanding subset scanning
methods in future work.
Although still overall low detection power, we point out
that our method has a higher probability of detecting the
“higher confidence κ = 20” CW attacks than the less confi-
dent versions. This is because the higher confidence attacks
require more deviations in the activation space than their
lower confidence versions.
Some attack types did not have 100% success rate. BIM
failed to change the predicted label on 0.6% of images for 
of 0.01. FGSM failed to change the predicted label on 6.1%
,9.8%, and 18.8% of images for  = 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, respec-
tively. CW failed to to generate “high confidence” attacks
for 17.3% for κ = 20. In all of these cases the failed attacks
were removed before calculating detection power.
In addition to subset scanning over the entire network we
also performed separate searches over individual layers of
the network. This may be thought of as a rudimentary con-
straint put on the search process, requiring subsets of nodes
to be contained in a single layer. More sophisticated con-
straints are proposed in detail in Section 4.
Figure 2 shows the detection power of the Berk-Jones
scoring function when scanning over individual layers of the
network. We make two observations on these results of in-
creasing importance. The first is the increase in detection
power when scanning over just the first pooling layer com-
pared to scanning over subsets of nodes in the entire net-
work. Changes to the pixel space are best captured by the
pooling layer that condenses the first two convolution lay-
ers.
Second, we note the unexpected behavior at Layer Conv
4 and partly Pool 2. The AUC values less than 0.5 are
due to the score of the most anomalous subset of nodes in
Conv 4 from noised images being less than the score of the
most anomalous subset of nodes in Conv 4 for clean im-
ages. In other words normal activity is anomalously absent
in those layers for noised images. We hypothesize that ad-
versarial noise may more easily confuse neural networks by
de-constructing the signal of the original image rather than
overpowering it with a rogue signal. This “interference” ap-
proach results in large amounts of non-interesting activa-
tions in the presence of noise compared to the structure of
activations for clean images. Further work is needed on dif-
ferent network architectures to explore this phenomenon.
We conclude the adversarial noise results by locating
where (i.e. which layer) in the network the most anomalous
activations are triggering. For this approach, we return to
subset scanning over the entire network and define a rep-
resentation metric for each subset S and Layer Lk of the
network Rep(S,Lk) =
|S∩Lk|
|S| /
|Lk|∑
l |Ll| . Representation of a
subset and layer has a value of 1 if the proportion of anoma-
lous nodes in the subset and the layer is proportional to the
relative size of the layer within the network. This metric al-
lows measuring the relative “size” of the subset within a sin-
gle layer despite layers varying in the number of nodes.
Figure 3 plots the representation for each subset of the
1000 noised (BIM  = 0.05) and clean images.
We again make two observations of increasing impor-
tance. First, we see that anomalous activity (as identified
by subset scanning) of clean images is equally represented
across all layers with most subsets having representation
centered over 1.0.
Second, and more consequential, adversarial images have
anomalous activity over-represented in Pool 1 and under-
represented in Conv 4 and Pool 2. This characterization of
anomalous activity, as identified by our method, also sug-
gests the “interference” theory of adversarial noise: Anoma-
lous activations in the shallower layers of the network sup-
press the activation structure of the original image in deeper
layers.
4 Extensions
To enable further clarity and applicability of the current
work, many extensions of the method have been left for fu-
ture work. These extensions may increase detection power
or characterization or both.
Simple Extensions
We note that 2-tailed testing is a reasonable approach for
tanh and sigmoid activation functions. The definition of “ex-
treme” activations carries over to either larger or smaller
than expected intuitively. It is also possible to calculate
density-based p-values where anomalousness is measured
Figure 3: Representation measures the size of the subset in a
given layer proportional to the size of the layer in the entire
network. Values are shown for the BIM  = 0.05 attack.
by activations from a low density area of the background
activations. This is particularly relevant in deeper nodes
where bimodal distributions are likely. This extension re-
quires learning a univariate kernel density estimate at each
node, but this can be done offline on background data only.
Additionally, we note that it may be worth calculating
conditional p-values where every label has its own set of
background activations. Then at the time of evaluation only
the predicted class’s background is used for calculating p-
value ranges. This may be particularly powerful for the ad-
versarial noise setting, but it does reduce the size of the back-
ground activations by the number of classes.
Finally, the NPSS scoring functions have an additional
tuning parameter αmax that has been left at 1.0 for this work.
This means we were able to identify very large subsets of the
activations that were all slightly anomalous. Smaller values
of αmax limit the search space to a smaller number of more
anomalous activations within the network. Smaller values
have been shown to increase detection power further if the
prior belief is a small fraction of the data records are partic-
ipating in the pattern (McFowland III, Speakman, and Neill
2013).
Enforcing Hard Constraints
Constraints on the search space are essential parts of subset
scanning. Without constraints, it is likely that inputs drawn
from the null distribution will look anomalous by chance
by “matching to the noise”. This hurts detection power de-
spite there being a clear anomalous pattern in the alterna-
tive. In short, scanning over all subsets may be computa-
tionally tractable for scoring functions satisfying LTSS, but
it is likely too broad of a search space to capture statistical
significance.
This work briefly demonstrated one hard constraint on
the search space by performing scans on individual layers
of the network as shown in Figure 2. This simple extension
increased detection power when scanning over the first pool-
ing layer compared to scanning over all subsets of the net-
work. Furthermore, on results not shown in this paper, we
are able to increase the detection of CW κ = 20 from 0.5978
to 0.6553 by scanning over the first 3 layers combined.
Hard connectivity constraints on subset scanning have
been used to identify an anomalous subset of data records
that are connected in an underlying graph structure that is
either known (Speakman, McFowland III, and Neill 2015;
Speakman, Zhang, and Neill 2013) or unknown (Somanchi
and Neill 2017). Unfortunately, identifying the highest-
scoring connected subset is exponential in the number of
nodes and a heuristic alternative could be used to identify
a high-scoring connected subset (Chen and Neill 2014).
Enforcing Soft Constraints
In addition to changing the search space, we may also al-
ter the definition of anomalousness by making changes to
the scoring function itself. For example, we may wish to in-
crease the score of a subset that contains nodes in Pool 1
Layer while decreasing the score of a subset that contains
nodes in the Conv 4 Layer. These additional terms can be
interpreted as the prior log-odds that a given node will be in-
cluded in the most anomalous subset (Speakman et al. 2016).
Adversarial Noise and Additional Domains
We emphasize that this work is not proposing a proper de-
fense to adversarial noise. However, detection is a critical
component of a strong defense. Additional work is needed to
turn detection into robustness by leveraging the most anoma-
lous subset activations.
Continuing in the unsupervised fashion, we could mask
activations from nodes in certain layers that were deemed
anomalous to prevent them from propagating the anomalous
pattern. In a supervised setting, the information contained
in the most anomalous subset could be used as features for
training a separate classifier. For example, systematically
counting the number of nodes in the most anomalous sub-
set in Pool 1 and Conv 4 could be powerful features.
We note potential for using the subset score to formu-
late an attack, rather than a tool for detection. Incorporating
the subset score into the loss function of an iterative attack
would minimize both the perturbation to the pixel space as
well as deviations in the activation space (Carlini and Wag-
ner 2017a).
Continuing in the security space, we can also apply sub-
set scanning to data poisoning (Biggio, Nelson, and Laskov
2012; Biggio et al. 2013). This current work has considered
each image individually, but it is possible to expand it so that
the method identifies a group of images that are all anoma-
lous for the same reasons in the activation space. This is the
original intention of the Fast Generalized Subset Scan(Mc-
Fowland III, Speakman, and Neill 2013).
Leaving the security domain, anomalous pattern detection
on neural network activations can be expanded to more gen-
eral settings of detecting out-of-distribution samples. This
view has implications for detecting bias in classifiers, dis-
tribution shift for temporal data, and identifying when new
class labels may appear in life-long learning domain.
Finally, we acknowledge that subset scanning over activa-
tions of neural networks may have uses in capturing patterns
in normal, non-anomalous data. Identifying which subset of
nodes activate higher than expected in a given network while
processing normal inputs has implications for explainable
A.I. (Olah et al. 2018).
5 Conclusion
This work uses the Adversarial Noise domain as an effective
narrative device to demonstrate that anomalous patterns in
the activation space of neural networks can be Quantified,
Detected, and Characterized.
The primary contribution of this work to the deep learning
literature is a novel, unsupervised anomaly detector that can
be applied to any pre-trained, off-the-shelf neural network
model. The method is based on subset scanning which treats
the detection problem as a search for the highest scoring
(most anomalous) subset of node activations as measured by
non-parametric scan statistics. These scoring functions sat-
isfy the Linear Time Subset Scanning property which allows
for exact, efficient maximization over all 2J possible subsets
of nodes in a network containing J nodes.
Our method is able to quantify activation data on the order
of 100,000 dimensions into a single real-valued anomalous-
ness “score”. We then used this score to detect images that
had been perturbed by an adversary in order to change the
network’s class label of the input. Finally, we used the iden-
tified subset of anomalous nodes in the network to charac-
terize the adversarial noise pattern. This analysis highlighted
a possible “interference” mode of adversarial noise that uses
anomalous activations in the shallow layers to suppress the
the true activation pattern of the original image.
We concluded the work by highlighting multiple exten-
sions of subset scanning into the deep learning space. Many
of these extensions attempt to overcome the relative weak
detection power of unconstrained subset scanning that was
introduced in this work. This is accomplished by enforcing
constraints on the search space or alterations to the scoring
functions, or both.
Additional domains outside of adversarial noise and se-
curity will also benefit from identifying anomalous activity
within neural networks. Life-long learning models need to
recognize when a new class of inputs become available and
production level systems must always guard against distri-
bution shift over time.
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